Hesperus, The Evening Star, And Externalist Theories Of Concepts

Introduction: The Puzzle of Coreference and Conceptual Understanding

The philosophical landscape concerning names, reference, and meaning is vast and intricate. A central debate revolves around how we, as language users, connect words to the world. Specifically, how do proper names, like "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus," manage to pick out the objects they refer to? This question becomes particularly intriguing when we consider cases where two names, seemingly distinct, actually refer to the same entity. The classic example, famously discussed by Gottlob Frege and later by Saul Kripke, involves the names "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus." These names, both referring to the planet Venus, were historically used to denote the evening star and the morning star, respectively. The puzzle arises because a competent speaker might know and use both names without realizing they refer to the same celestial body. This raises fundamental questions about the nature of meaning, reference, and the content of our concepts. How can someone sincerely assert "Hesperus is Hesperus" as a trivial truth while simultaneously regarding "Hesperus is Phosphorus" as a potentially informative statement? This apparent paradox challenges traditional theories of meaning that equate a name's meaning with its referent. The problem extends beyond mere linguistic curiosity, touching upon deeper issues concerning the nature of belief, knowledge, and the relationship between language and thought. To delve into these complexities, we need to explore different philosophical perspectives, particularly those offered by externalist theories of concepts, which challenge the idea that the meanings of our words and the content of our thoughts are solely determined by internal mental states. The journey through these philosophical waters will lead us to grapple with profound questions about the nature of reality, the limits of our knowledge, and the very essence of what it means to understand something.

Kripke's Contribution: Names as Rigid Designators

Saul Kripke, in his influential work Naming and Necessity, revolutionized the philosophy of language by introducing the concept of rigid designation. Kripke argued that proper names are not simply disguised descriptions, as some earlier theories had suggested. Instead, he proposed that names function as rigid designators, meaning they refer to the same object in every possible world in which that object exists. This contrasts sharply with descriptions, which may pick out different objects in different possible worlds. For example, the description "the evening star" might have referred to a different celestial body if the solar system had formed differently. However, the name "Hesperus," according to Kripke, rigidly designates Venus, regardless of the circumstances. This rigidity has profound implications for our understanding of identity statements like "Hesperus is Phosphorus." If names were merely disguised descriptions, then the truth of such statements would depend on contingent facts about the world. For instance, if "Hesperus" meant "the evening star" and "Phosphorus" meant "the morning star," then the statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" would be true only because, as a matter of empirical fact, the evening star and the morning star happen to be the same object, Venus. However, Kripke argued that identity statements involving rigid designators, if true, are necessarily true. This means that if Hesperus is indeed Phosphorus, then it is impossible for them to be distinct. This modal argument, focusing on necessity and possibility, highlights the unique semantic role of proper names. Kripke's theory challenged the traditional Fregean view that the meaning of a name is its sense, which determines its reference. Instead, Kripke suggested a more direct connection between names and their referents, a connection that bypasses the need for mediating senses. This direct reference theory has become a cornerstone of contemporary philosophy of language, influencing debates about meaning, reference, and the nature of thought.

Sense and Reference: Frege's Seminal Distinction

Gottlob Frege, a towering figure in the history of logic and philosophy, laid the groundwork for modern semantics with his distinction between sense and reference. Frege observed that identity statements, such as "Hesperus is Phosphorus," present a puzzle. While the statement "Hesperus is Hesperus" is trivially true and conveys no new information, "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is potentially informative and requires empirical discovery. Frege reasoned that if the meaning of a name were simply its referent (the object it picks out), then both statements should have the same cognitive value, which is clearly not the case. To resolve this puzzle, Frege introduced the concept of sense. The sense of an expression, he argued, is the mode of presentation of its referent. It is the way in which the object is given to us. Different expressions can have the same referent but different senses. For example, "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" both refer to Venus, but they have different senses: "Hesperus" presents Venus as the evening star, while "Phosphorus" presents it as the morning star. The sense of an expression, according to Frege, determines its referent. Understanding the sense is crucial for understanding the meaning of an expression and for explaining the cognitive significance of identity statements. When we learn that Hesperus is Phosphorus, we are not simply learning that Venus is Venus; we are learning that the object presented to us in two different ways is, in fact, the same object. Frege's distinction between sense and reference had a profound impact on subsequent philosophical discussions about meaning and language. It provided a framework for analyzing the complexities of linguistic communication and for understanding how we grasp the content of our thoughts. While Kripke challenged certain aspects of Frege's theory, particularly the idea that names have descriptive senses, Frege's insights remain central to our understanding of semantics and the philosophy of language.

Externalism: Meaning Beyond the Mind

Externalist theories of concepts challenge the traditional internalist view that the meanings of our words and the content of our thoughts are solely determined by internal mental states. Externalists argue that factors external to the mind, such as the social and physical environment, play a crucial role in shaping our concepts and determining the meanings of our words. The Hesperus/Phosphorus example provides a compelling case for externalism. A speaker might possess the concept of Hesperus and the concept of Phosphorus without realizing that they refer to the same object. This suggests that the content of these concepts is not simply determined by the speaker's internal mental representations. If it were, then the speaker would be in the same mental state when thinking about Hesperus and when thinking about Phosphorus, which is clearly not the case. Externalists propose that the meaning of a name, and the content of the corresponding concept, is partly determined by the causal history of the name's use and by the social practices surrounding it. The name "Hesperus" is connected to Venus through a historical chain of usage that originated with observations of the evening star. Similarly, "Phosphorus" is connected to Venus through a different historical chain originating with observations of the morning star. These different causal chains, and the different social contexts in which the names are used, contribute to the distinctness of the concepts, even though they refer to the same object. There are different strands of externalism. Social externalism, championed by philosophers like Tyler Burge, emphasizes the role of the social community in determining the content of our concepts. According to social externalism, we often defer to experts in our community to determine the correct application of a concept. Environmental externalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of the physical environment in shaping our concepts. This view suggests that our concepts are partly constituted by the objects and properties in the world to which they refer. Externalist theories have significant implications for our understanding of knowledge, belief, and the nature of mental content. They suggest that our minds are not isolated entities but are deeply embedded in and influenced by the world around us.

The Two Names, One Purpose Scenario: A Deeper Dive

Consider the scenario where two names, "N1" and "N2," are introduced into a language for exactly the same purpose. Let's say these names are intended to refer to the same object, but a speaker, S, learns about them in different circumstances, without realizing their coreference. This situation illuminates several key aspects of how we understand names, concepts, and the process of reference. For instance, imagine a scientific experiment where researchers discover a new particle. They initially observe it exhibiting property A and name it "N1." Later, they observe the same particle exhibiting property B, without realizing it's the same particle, and name it "N2." A scientist, S, learns about these discoveries from separate research papers and forms two distinct concepts associated with "N1" and "N2." S might believe that N1 has property A and N2 has property B, without realizing that N1 and N2 are, in fact, the same entity. This scenario highlights the distinction between knowing a name and knowing the referent of a name. S knows both names, "N1" and "N2," in the sense that they can use them in grammatically correct sentences and associate them with certain descriptions. However, S doesn't know that they refer to the same object. This lack of knowledge can lead to a variety of cognitive and behavioral consequences. For example, S might be surprised to learn that N1 is N2, or they might be willing to bet against the proposition that N1 is N2. This scenario also underscores the importance of context in understanding reference. The different circumstances in which S learned about "N1" and "N2" contributed to the formation of distinct concepts. The initial information associated with each name, the source of that information, and the specific inferences S drew from that information all played a role in shaping S's understanding. Furthermore, this situation provides a fertile ground for exploring the relationship between language, thought, and belief. S's beliefs about N1 and N2 are influenced by their linguistic knowledge, but they are also shaped by their background knowledge and their inferential abilities. Understanding how these factors interact is crucial for developing a comprehensive theory of meaning and reference.

Implications and Conclusion: Navigating the Complexities of Reference

The philosophical exploration of names like Hesperus and Phosphorus, and scenarios involving names introduced for the same purpose but learned in different contexts, reveals the complexities inherent in language and thought. The debate between internalist and externalist theories of concepts highlights the ongoing effort to understand how our minds connect with the world. Kripke's notion of rigid designation and Frege's distinction between sense and reference provide valuable tools for analyzing these connections. Ultimately, the puzzle of coreference, where two names refer to the same object but are understood differently, underscores the limitations of a purely internalist perspective. Our understanding of concepts is not solely determined by our internal mental states. External factors, such as the causal history of a name's use and the social practices surrounding it, play a crucial role in shaping our concepts and determining the meanings of our words. Recognizing the importance of these external factors allows us to develop a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of language, thought, and the world around us. The implications of these philosophical debates extend beyond academic circles. They have relevance for fields such as artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and even law, where understanding how people form concepts and make inferences is critical. By continuing to grapple with these fundamental questions, we can gain a deeper appreciation for the intricacies of human cognition and the remarkable capacity of language to both reflect and shape our understanding of reality. The journey through these philosophical landscapes is ongoing, and the insights gained along the way continue to illuminate the path towards a more complete understanding of ourselves and the world we inhabit.